We introduce a fragment of first-order logic with equality which strictly generalizes two already well-known ones -the Bernays-Schönfinkel-Ramsey fragment (BSR) and the Monadic fragment. Satisfiability remains decidable in the new fragment. The defining principle is the separation of universally quantified variables from existentially quantified ones on the level of atoms. Thus, our classification neither rests on restrictions of quantifier prefixes (as in the BSR case) nor on restrictions with respect to the arity of the occurring predicate symbols (as in the monadic case).
Separated Variables and Transposition of Quantifiers
Let ϕ be a first-order formula. We call two disjoint sets X and Y of variables separated in ϕ if and only if for all atoms A occurring in ϕ we either have vars(A) ∩ X = ∅ or vars(A) ∩ Y = ∅.
We first show how we can transpose quantifier blocks if the variables they bind are separated.
Proposition 3. Let ϕ( x, y, z) be a quantifier-free first-order formula in which x and y are separated. There exists some m ≥ 1 and a quantifier-free first-order formula ϕ ′ ( x, y 1 , . . . , y m , z) such that ∀ x.∃ y.ϕ( x, y, z) and ∃ y 1 . . . ∃ y m ∀ x.ϕ ′ ( x, y 1 , . . . , y m , z) are semantically equivalent, and the length of each of the vectors y k is identical to the length of y. Moreover, all atoms in ϕ ′ have already occurred in ϕ (modulo variable renaming).
Proof. ∀ x.∃ y.ϕ( x, y, z)
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∀ x.∃ y. All subformulas ϕ i,j , ψ i,j , χ i,j and ϕ ′ k,ℓ , ψ ′ k,ℓ,h , χ ′ k,ℓ shall be literals. It is possible to generalize this proposition to the case of several quantifier alternations as long as all universally quantified variables are separated from all existentially quantified ones. However, in the more general case, variable blocks under a universal quantifier need to be copied too.
Proposition 4. Let ϕ( x 1 , . . . , x n , y 1 , . . . , y n , z) be a quantifier-free first-order formula in which the sets x 1 ∪. . .∪ x n and y 1 ∪. . .∪ y n of variables are separated. There exists a quantifier-free first-order formula
. . , x n , y 1 , . . . , y n , z) and ∃ u∀ v.ϕ ′ ( u, v, z) are semantically equivalent and all atoms in ϕ ′ already occur in ϕ (modulo variable renaming). (Please note that x 1 and y n may be empty.)
Proof. We apply a syntactic transformation following the strategy of the proof of Proposition 3, but in an iterated fashion:
. . .
i,j ( v, z), respectively, i.e. quantifiers have been pulled outside and variables have been renamed appropriately.
In the following example we apply Proposition 3:
Example 5. Consider the formula ∀x∃y.P (x) ↔ Q(y).
On the one hand, it is easy to see that swapping the quantifiers ∀x and ∃y directly does not preserve semantics: whilst the formula P (c) ∧ ¬P (d) ∧ ∀x∃y.P (x) ↔ Q(y) is satisfiable, the version with swapped quantifiers
On the other hand, we can show equivalence of ∀x∃y.P (x) ↔ Q(y) and the formula ∃y 1 y 2 ∀x. P (x) → Q(y 1 ) ∧ ¬P (x) → ¬Q(y 2 ) :
(1)
Of course, there is a dual version of Proposition 3:
Proposition 6. Let ϕ( x, y, z) be a quantifier-free first-order formula in which x and y are separated. There exists a natural number m ≥ 1 and a quantifier-free first-order formula
. . , x m , y, z) are equivalent, the length of the vectors x k is identical to the length of x, and all atoms in ϕ ′ have already occurred in ϕ (modulo variable renaming).
And here is the dual example: We can show equivalence of ∃y∀x.P (x) ↔ Q(y) and the formula ∀x 1 x 2 ∃y. P (x 1 ) → Q(y) ∧ ¬P (x 2 ) → ¬Q(y) .
Next, we show that swapping quantifier blocks in accordance with Proposition 3, in the worst case, inevitably leads to an exponential blowup in the number of variables and the length of the formula. Consider the following first-order formula and how we can transpose the quantifier blocks therein.
We shall denote the formula in the first row by ϕ and the one in the last row by ϕ ′ . Consider the following interpretation A, which is a model of ϕ: Clearly, every formula ϕ * which is equivalent to ϕ exhibits property ( * ). We will argue that any such ϕ * (in prenex normal form) with a quantifier prefix of the form ∃ * ∀ * contains at least 2 n − 1 existential quantifiers.
Let ϕ * := ∃y 1 . . . y k ∀x 1 . . . x ℓ .χ * (with χ * being quantifier-free) be a prenex formula with minimal k that is equivalent to ϕ and is built from the same vocabulary. Since A is also a model of ϕ * , we know that there is a sequence of elements a 1 , . . . , a k taken from the domain U A such that
for any variable assignment β. Consequently, we can extend A to a model A * (over the same domain) of the skolemized formula
by adding c A * j := a j for every j. On the other hand, every model of the skolemized formula ϕ Sk immediately yields a model of ϕ * (based on an extended signature).
The signature underlying this skolemized formula comprises exactly the constant symbols c 1 , . . . , c k (otherwise ϕ * is not a prenex formula with minimal k) and does not contain any other function symbols. Since ϕ Sk contains only universal quantifiers, substructures of models of ϕ Sk are again models (cf. Substructure Lemma (Lemma 5.7, page 46) in [EFT96] ).
With respect to A * a substructure is any interpretation B with universe U B ⊆ U A * , predicates P In observation ( * ) we have seen that the universe of A cannot be cut down so that it contains strictly fewer than 2 n − 1 elements a ′ b
, which are a member of at least one Q A i , while keeping all the ab in the universe. Consequently, the universe of A * cannot be cut down in such a way. Hence, such a cut-down interpretation B is not a substructure of A * , for otherwise the substructure lemma would be violated. The only possible reason why B could fail to be a substructure, is the fact that for every a . And this means the signature of A * must contain at least 2 n − 1 constant symbols. Hence, k must be at least 2 n − 1. Moreover, every y i must occur in ϕ * since otherwise k cannot be minimal.
This evidently shows that ϕ ′ is (almost) optimal regarding the number of existentially quantified variables it contains.
We next explore some of the consequences of Proposition 4. It is well-known that the BernaysSchönfinkel fragment of first-order logic is decidable. This fragment comprises all first-order sentences without non-constant function symbols and the quantifier prefix ∃ * ∀ * if transformed to prenex normal form. The same holds when equality is added to the fragment, which yields the Bernays-Schönfinkel-Ramsey fragment. By virtue of Proposition 4, we can now extend this decidability result to the following fragment of first-order logic:
Definition 7 (Separated Fragment (SF)). The Separated Fragment (SF) of first-order logic shall consist of all existential closures of formulas in which existentially quantified variables are separated from universally quantified ones.
More formally, it consists of all first-order sentences with equality but without non-constant function symbols which are of the form ∃ z∀ x 1 ∃ y 1 . . . ∀ x n ∃ y n .ϕ( x 1 , . . . , x n , y 1 , . . . , y n , z) in which ϕ is quantifier-free and the sets x 1 ∪ . . . ∪ x n and y 1 ∪ . . . ∪ y n are separated.
As already stated, Proposition 4 shows that every formula in SF can be transformed into an equivalent one which belongs to the Bernays-Schönfinkel fragment (BS). When we allow for the equality predicate in the Separated Fragment, we get a reduction to the Bernays-Schönfinkel-Ramsey (BSR) fragment.
It is worth noticing, that SF is not only a proper superset of BS (and BSR) but also of one more well-known decidable first-order fragment, namely the Relational Monadic fragment, i.e. the set of first-order formulas without non-constant function symbols and without equality in which only predicate symbols of arity one are allowed. In Section 3, we show how SF can be extended so that the Relational Monadic fragment with equality and also the Full Monadic fragment without equality (i.e. Relational Monadic plus unary function symbols) become proper subsets of the extended fragment.
Extensions of the Separated Fragment
In this section we describe methods which may turn SF into a proper superset of the Löb-Gurevich fragment (the Monadic fragment without equality but with unary function symbols) and the Relational Monadic fragment with equality (but without non-constant function symbols). We will show how formulas from both fragments can be transformed into ones obeying Definition 7.
Unary function symbols
Adopting a method due to Grädel (cf. proof of Proposition 6.2.7 in [BGG97]), we can add unary function symbols to the fragment (in a restricted fashion).
Proposition 8. Let ϕ be a first-order formula without non-unary function symbols (constants are allowed). If the unary function symbols in ϕ exclusively occur in atoms starting with a unary predicate symbol, then we can find an equisatisfiable first-order formula ϕ ′ without non-constant function symbols such that any model B of ϕ ′ can be transformed into a model A of ϕ over the same domain.
Proof. Let f 1 , . . . , f k be the unary function symbols occurring in ϕ. We apply the following transformation iteratively:
Assume ϕ contains the atom P (f i (t)) for some term t and indices i ≤ k. We may transform ϕ into
where the R shall be fresh unary predicate symbols and ϕ P (f i (t)) R(t) is the formula we obtain from ϕ by replacing every occurrence of P (f i (t)) by R(t). Applying this transformation exhaustively on ϕ, we end up with a formula of the form
which does not contain any non-constant function symbols.
Please note that the P j in the resulting formula may also range over predicate symbols which have not occurred in the original ϕ, but which have been introduced while flattening a nested atom such as P (f (g(t))) to Q(t) ∧ ∀x.P (f (x)) ↔ R(x) ∧ ∀x.R(g(x)) ↔ Q(x) .
If we now allow for unary function symbols occurring in monadic atoms in SF, as Proposition 8 suggests, this extended fragment becomes a proper superset of the Full Monadic fragment without equality, sometimes called the Löb-Gurevich fragment.
Equality
Equality in SF, as defined in Definition 7, is subject to the separation condition. However, there is no such restriction in monadic formulas with equality. For instance, while a formula ∀x∃y.x ≈ y is admitted for the Monadic fragment with equality, the sets {x} and {y} are not separated in this sentence. Thus, it does not fulfill Definition 7.
We will show in this section why the separation restriction may be jettisoned for equations, if the sentence at hand exhibits the small model property. Having the small model property means that if the sentence is satisfiable, it has a finite model. In addition, it must admit computing an upper bound on the size of models -if there is no model up to this size, then there is none at all.
Concretely, we shall start by treating the case of Monadic sentences with equality but without non-constant function symbols.
1
The idea of the following proposition may best be described in terms of the second-order concept of Leibniz-equality: x ≈ y ↔ ∀P.P (x) ↔ P (y) . Of course, this is not first-order expressible in full generality. However, if the formula we consider enjoys the small model property, we can transfer this concept as long as we are only interested in satisfiability.
Proposition 9. We can turn every sentence in the Relational Monadic fragment with equality into an equisatisfiable Relational Monadic sentence without equality.
Proof. Let ϕ be a first-order sentence containing no non-constant function symbols and only n unary predicate symbols P 1 , . . . , P n (besides the equality predicate). Let k be the number of occurrences of quantifiers in ϕ plus the number of constant symbols in ϕ, and set κ := ⌈log 2 k⌉. We extend the underlying signature with fresh unary predicate symbols Q 1 , . . . , Q κ and define the formula
Let ϕ ′ be constructed from ϕ by replacing every occurrence of an equation x ≈ y with ψ ≈ (x, y). We show that ϕ is satisfiable if and only if ϕ ′ is so.
From this point on, we follow the basic outline as the proof of Proposition 6.2.1 in [BGG97] . Let A be a model of ϕ over the domain U A . We define a coloring λ : U A → {0, 1} n for which λ(a) = b 1 , . . . , b n shall be defined such that b i = 1 if and only if a ∈ P A i . We now partition U A into parts Ub such that every Ub contains only elements of colorb.
Starting from A we construct an interpretation A ′ by arbitrarily choosing subsets U . Moreover, we set P 
Now let B
′ be an arbitrary model of ϕ ′ . We now construct a coloring λ ′ : U B ′ → {0, 1} n+κ analogously to λ, but now also taking the predicates Q B ′ i into account. Again, we partition U B ′ into parts Ub so that all elements in a set Ub are assigned the same color by λ ′ . We now define the new universe U B by arbitrarily picking exactly one elements from each part Ub. In addition, we set P More generally, we can formulate the above proposition for all sentences which exhibit the small model property.
Proposition 10. Let ϕ be a first-order logic sentence with equality. Suppose, we can compute a positive integer k such that (a) if ϕ is satisfiable, then there is a model A |= ϕ over a universe of cardinality at most k.
Let κ := ⌈log 2 k⌉. We can transform ϕ into a sentence ϕ ′ without equality using only the vocabulary of ϕ plus κ fresh unary predicate symbols Q 1 , . . . , Q κ .
Proof Sketch. In essence, the proof follows the one of Proposition 9. However, since ϕ may also contain non-unary predicate symbols, the encoding of equality requires congruence axioms.
First, ψ ≈ (x, y) becomes slightly simpler:
In addition, we need the following congruence axioms (where P ranges over all predicate symbols in ϕ, except the equality predicate, and x i , x 
Now, we construct ϕ
′ from ϕ by replacing every occurrence of an equation s ≈ t by the formula ψ ≈ (x, y) x, y s, t , and by conjunctively connecting ψ cong to it.
